just a matter of time: interview with George Stalk
While everyone else was debating the relative merits of quality and cost, consultant George Stalk was the first to suggest that, as a source of competitive advantage, nothing trumps time.
Mitch Mac Donald has more than 30 years of experience in both the newspaper and magazine businesses. He has covered the logistics and supply chain fields since 1988. Twice named one of the Top 10 Business Journalists in the U.S., he has served in a multitude of editorial and publishing roles. The leading force behind the launch of Supply Chain Management Review, he was that brand's founding publisher and editorial director from 1997 to 2000. Additionally, he has served as news editor, chief editor, publisher and editorial director of Logistics Management, as well as publisher of Modern Materials Handling. Mitch is also the president and CEO of Agile Business Media, LLC, the parent company of DC VELOCITY and CSCMP's Supply Chain Quarterly.
Maybe it has to do with living on a farm outside Toronto with his wife and six kids. Perhaps heading to more bucolic environs at the end of a busy workday helps George Stalk clear his mind. Whatever his source of inspiration, there's no denying the results: Time and again, the star consultant has demonstrated a remarkable ability to see things others miss.
Back in the '80s, for example, when the rest of the business world was hailing quality as the definitive source of competitive advantage, Stalk was quietly investigating another possibility. What he came up with was the then-radical notion that although cost and quality matter, the real key is time. As Stalk says, "If you give me two companies, both the same size, but one with great merchandise and a lousy supply chain and one with mediocre merchandise and a great supply chain, the one with the … great supply chain will win every time. They can just react faster."
Stalk is still at it today. Now a senior partner and managing director at the Boston Consulting Group Inc., he specializes in helping clients come up with what he calls an "unassailable competitive advantage." And yes, he continues to toss out profound insights like a peanut vendor at Fenway Park on a Saturday in July.
During his nearly 30 years with BCG, Stalk has consulted to a variety of leading manufacturing, technology, and consumer products companies throughout North and South America, Europe, and Asia. For over a decade, he lived and worked in Japan, where he studied Japanese manufacturing strategies and techniques. To demonstrate that those Japanese techniques could be exported to North America, Stalk once ran a client's factory in the United States— an experiment that yielded substantial cost reductions and quality improvements as well as a tenfold reduction in throughput times.
Stalk is the co-author of several business books, including Kaisha: The Japanese Corporation, Hardball: Are You Playing to Play or Playing to Win? and the best-seller on time-based competition, Competing Against Time. He has just wrapped up his latest book: Memos to the CEO: Strategies in Our Future, which is scheduled to be published in the first quarter of 2008. He spoke recently with DC VELOCITY Group Editorial Director Mitch Mac Donald about how he first got involved with the supply chain, the three hallmarks of supply chain excellence, and how the profession nearly became known as "business systems management."
Q: Tell us about the Boston Consulting Group.
A: The Boston Consulting Group was formed in 1963. It was a bit of a maverick in the business consultancy world in that from the very first day, it focused on corporate strategy. That was something new back then. Until BCG was formed, pretty much all of the business consultancies were focused on optimizing various functions, like sales effectiveness and quality and so forth. Our founder came along and recognized that there was another whole way to look at this issue of business success—that there was a case to be made for looking across all the functions in deciding how to create competitive advantage. That competitive advantage is at the root of profitability. Without competitive advantage, there is no profitability, or in some cases, like the airline industry, there is only enough profitability to barely hang on. The airlines are among those industries that hang on by their fingernails because they have a hard time establishing competitive advantage until somebody like Southwest comes along with a different business model that actually is advantaged, and they make all the money in the industry.
Q: Was it that unique approach to business consulting that attracted you to BCG?
A: That was a big part of it. That approach seemed very logical and very appealing. I joined BCG in 1978. I had never intended to be a management consultant. I was much more interested in high-tech industries because I had done a lot of work in computer graphics and computer design. I joined BCG with the intention of staying for a couple of years and then moving on, which is pretty much the modus operandi of consultants. They never intend to stay longer than two years. We call it the rolling career horizon. It rolls from two to four to eight to 16 to, in my case, it will be 30 next year.
Q: At what point did you start getting involved in the supply chain?
A: When I was in Japan in the 1980s, I began to get very seriously entangled with supply chain issues, but I wouldn't have called what I was doing back then "supply chain." Quite frankly, I was interested in Japanese manufacturing. In particular, I was interested in some things that people weren't even talking about back then. At the time, they were still talking about quality and inventory and such. What they missed—and still, quite frankly, do miss—is the notion that Japanese manufacturing results in factories that produce stuff much faster than traditional manufacturing. They are able to produce at higher levels of variety without the cost penalties that most Western factories encounter. That enables companies like Toyota, for example, to broaden their product line so that by the late 1980s, they had a broader product line than General Motors even though they were only a third the size.
Q: Did that change your perspective on how business strategies are developed?
A: Yes. When I came back from Japan in the mid '80s, I went to our CEO and said, "Look, I know we see ourselves as generalists, but I am not going to be a generalist. I'm going to focus on time because time affects all businesses."
Time is a critical management variable that few people actively manage until a competitor demonstrates to them that they could do it much faster. Most people respond to it when it becomes a problem, but a few see an opportunity in it. So time became my focus from about 1985 to the early '90s. We used time everywhere. We were actually doing re-engineering before re-engineering became popular because time-based competition is re-engineering plus time plus strategy. The notion was, you really make your money if you can do something differently than a competitor as opposed to just getting better. If everybody gets better, nobody makes any money. It all gets tossed away in the marketplace.
Q: So you focused on time as a key competitive differentiator?
A: Yes, and now there are lots of examples out there of companies that see opportunities in time. It is certainly true today in supply chain practices. Zara is an example of a company that's cleaning up in Europe's department store and specialty store business because it can replenish stock in stores faster than its competitors can and it takes advantage of that. Zara is able to replace the stock on its shelves once every two weeks. Its competitors are on two- to three-month cycles.
Q: Is that something Zara deliberately set out to do?
A: Absolutely, although your question is a good one. Many companies seem to back into a time-based approach almost accidentally and only later realize that it is the reason for their success.
That wasn't the case with Zara, however. Zara started off with a little company in the northern part of Spain. It had local manufacturing—kind of like Benetton did back in the '80s. It began to branch out, and its business grew, but it views itself a little differently than everyone else does. Though everybody sees them as a high-quality purveyor of goods to fashion markets, the Zara guys know that their true advantage is the supply chain.
Interestingly, when you look at Zara U.S., it doesn't run like Zara Europe because they can't replicate the supply chain here. But they know that. Eventually, they are going to fix the U.S. model. They are going to figure out how to do the same thing in the United States.
Q: What makes Zara's European supply chain so effective?
A: Well, in Europe the company has a very fast supply chain because it uses local manufacturing. Local manufacturing is set up for fast turnaround. In the end, you don't have to be the fastest on the road; you just have to be faster than your competitors—which, in Zara's case, are the established department stores and most of the big specialty stores.
Though it would like to take advantage of the lower costs, Zara doesn't do a lot of sourcing from China. The reason is that it can't afford the time delays from China. In retail, the secret is having what is selling and not having what isn't selling. It's as basic as that.
Q: It's hard to argue with the "basics."
A: If you give me two companies, both the same size, but one with great merchandise and a lousy supply chain and one with mediocre merchandise and a great supply chain, the one with the mediocre merchandise and the great supply chain will win every time. They can just react faster.
That's critical in the retail business. It is just impossible to predict what the market is going to do. The guy who can respond to the market the fastest once they get the signals back wins. The guy who can't ends up marking stuff down because he bought the wrong stuff for the wrong time—that's really what kills you.
Q: Backing up just a bit, I get the sense you were actually doing supply chain stuff before the term even existed.
A: You're right. It isn't like we were sitting there saying, "Wow, we are doing supply chain; where is the rest of the world?" But we were looking at business systems, and supply chain is a big chunk of that because it's the supply chain that connects together the major elements of the system. When we talked business systems, not only did we talk about those connections, but we also talked about what went on inside of those major elements.
When I first started peeking inside Japanese manufacturing, I realized that the factories were 10 times faster than Western factories not because the Japanese system was 10 times faster, but because the manufacturing element was 10 times faster. What was really interesting about working with the Japanese is it became clear—I saw it first at Toyota— that once the factories became extremely quick and very cost effective, the Japanese turned around and said, "Well you know, all this stuff is getting wasted in the supply chain," although at the time, as you said, they didn't call it "supply chain." So Toyota merged the sales company with the manufacturing company. I was in Tokyo at the time that it happened. The conventional wisdom was that Toyota was becoming more customer-oriented, more marketing-oriented. The conventional wisdom didn't prevail, though. Within two years, all of the executives in the sales company had been replaced by manufacturing guys. Here, the press was running around saying, "Finally, they are becoming consumeroriented," but in reality what had happened was that manufacturing had taken over the company.
It took a very deliberate, focused program to make sure that no more time or money was spent distributing and selling cars than was needed to make them. They did this in Japan first. Japan was the first place in the world where the 15-day car actually happened.Where you could order a car that hadn't been built and 15 days later, you would get it. The whole supply chain had to work in harmony for that to happen, but we weren't calling it "supply chain." We were calling it "systems" or "business systems," which is very pointy headed. "Business systems" is probably the more accurate term, but over time, the less accurate and less pointy-headed term always wins, so "supply chain" eventually won.
Q: Would you say there is a set of core characteristics that distinguish one company's supply chain from another in terms of a competitive advantage?
A: First and foremost is that the CEO has to know he's in charge of the supply chain. The companies doing the best job of competing on the basis of their supply chain are the ones where the guy at the top knows that and everybody who works for him knows that—and knows that the guy at the top is watching them.
The second hallmark is that people are measured on system performance, not on individual functional performance. Success in a functional silo, like achieving lower transportation costs, is all well and good, but what are the ramifications of that? Is it causing problems in other parts of the company or even hurting the bottom line?
The third hallmark is that they understand time and that they are hell bent on taking time out of the system. The objective has to be taking time out of all steps in the chain. It might be the hardest part of improving the supply chain because you've got to start changing stuff—changing factories, changing lot sizes, changing shipment sizes, and so on. Instead of 15,000 container ships, you might want to go with 4,000 because they can make more frequent trips.
Q: I expect you find it frustrating that after extolling the virtues of integrated supply chain management for all these years, we're still having to warn against the consequences of siloed thinking?
A: I know. It is amazing. You know, the very same companies will have multi-functional teams designing new products. To them, that is normal. And it is normal. It is the way to do things. The notion that managing the supply chain should be a similarly multi-functional task just doesn't seem to be considered normal.
An automotive company I did some work with decided to consolidate production of V6 engines to save money. Their thought was to get the production volumes up and consolidate operations in one big factory, rather than three. But they put the factory in Europe. Well, that is great for V6s for European cars, but actually V6 is not the predominant engine in Europe. It is a V4.Most V6s actually go into mid-sized cars in the United States. So now these engines are being shipped in containers from Europe to the United States. So far, so good. Most likely, the guys who ran the numbers said, "Well, you know, we are still lower cost even with the shipping penalty." Then you run into some kind of blip in demand or a quality problem, and suddenly this extended supply chain begins to work against them. You'd be amazed at how many thousands of V6 engines at this company ended up having to be shipped by air because they were in a panic.
Q: Globalization really has served to complicate a lot of the supply chain-based decisions, hasn't it?
A: Absolutely. There's this continued flight toward lowcost sourcing. Lowering your costs is resulting in an expansion of your footprint, but it doesn't usually carry with it an understanding of the system costs. As always, however, there are faint signals of a new strategy. There is a company in the United States called American Apparel, which does all of its manufacturing in Los Angeles—they have 3,000 people making T-shirts in Los Angeles. They're on record as saying they cannot source from China because it will mess up their business model. Their business model is one of rapid replenishment. They recognize that, so they know immediately that low-cost sourcing overseas is not a strategy that fits with their business model.
Most of the apparel sold in North America is manufactured in Asia, meaning the finished goods travel long distances to reach end markets, with all the associated greenhouse gas emissions. On top of that, apparel manufacturing itself requires a significant amount of energy, water, and raw materials like cotton. Overall, the production of apparel is responsible for about 2% of the world’s total greenhouse gas emissions, according to a report titled
Taking Stock of Progress Against the Roadmap to Net Zeroby the Apparel Impact Institute. Founded in 2017, the Apparel Impact Institute is an organization dedicated to identifying, funding, and then scaling solutions aimed at reducing the carbon emissions and other environmental impacts of the apparel and textile industries.
The author of this annual study is researcher and consultant Michael Sadowski. He wrote the first report in 2021 as well as the latest edition, which was released earlier this year. Sadowski, who is also executive director of the environmental nonprofit
The Circulate Initiative, recently joined DC Velocity Group Editorial Director David Maloney on an episode of the “Logistics Matters” podcast to discuss the key findings of the research, what companies are doing to reduce emissions, and the progress they’ve made since the first report was issued.
A: While companies in the apparel industry can set their own sustainability targets, we realized there was a need to give them a blueprint for actually reducing emissions. And so, we produced the first report back in 2021, where we laid out the emissions from the sector, based on the best estimates [we could make using] data from various sources. It gives companies and the sector a blueprint for what we collectively need to do to drive toward the ambitious reduction [target] of staying within a 1.5 degrees Celsius pathway. That was the first report, and then we committed to refresh the analysis on an annual basis. The second report was published last year, and the third report came out in May of this year.
Q: What were some of the key findings of your research?
A: We found that about half of the emissions in the sector come from Tier Two, which is essentially textile production. That includes the knitting, weaving, dyeing, and finishing of fabric, which together account for over half of the total emissions. That was a really important finding, and it allows us to focus our attention on the interventions that can drive those emissions down.
Raw material production accounts for another quarter of emissions. That includes cotton farming, extracting gas and oil from the ground to make synthetics, and things like that. So we now have a really keen understanding of the source of our industry’s emissions.
Q: Your report mentions that the apparel industry is responsible for about 2% of global emissions. Is that an accurate statistic?
A: That’s our best estimate of the total emissions [generated by] the apparel sector. Some other reports on the industry have apparel at up to 8% of global emissions. And there is a commonly misquoted number in the media that it’s 10%. From my perspective, I think the best estimate is somewhere under 2%.
We know that globally, humankind needs to reduce emissions by roughly half by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050 to hit international goals. [Reaching that target will require the involvement of] every facet of the global economy and every aspect of the apparel sector—transportation, material production, manufacturing, cotton farming. Through our work and that of others, I think the apparel sector understands what has to happen. We have highlighted examples of how companies are taking action to reduce emissions in the roadmap reports.
Q: What are some of those actions the industry can take to reduce emissions?
A: I think one of the positive developments since we wrote the first report is that we’re seeing companies really focus on the most impactful areas. We see companies diving deep on thermal energy, for example. With respect to Tier Two, we [focus] a lot of attention on things like ocean freight versus air. There’s a rule of thumb I’ve heard that indicates air freight is about 10 times the cost [of ocean] and also produces 10 times more greenhouse gas emissions.
There is money available to invest in sustainability efforts. It’s really exciting to see the funding that’s coming through for AI [artificial intelligence] and to see that individual companies, such as H&M and Lululemon, are investing in real solutions in their supply chains. I think a lot of concrete actions are being taken.
And yet we know that reducing emissions by half on an absolute basis by 2030 is a monumental undertaking. So I don’t want to be overly optimistic, because I think we have a lot of work to do. But I do think we’ve got some amazing progress happening.
Q: You mentioned several companies that are starting to address their emissions. Is that a result of their being more aware of the emissions they generate? Have you seen progress made since the first report came out in 2021?
A: Yes. When we published the first roadmap back in 2021, our statistics showed that only about 12 companies had met the criteria [for setting] science-based targets. In 2024, the number of apparel, textile, and footwear companies that have set targets or have commitments to set targets is close to 500. It’s an enormous increase. I think they see the urgency more than other sectors do.
We have companies that have been working at sustainability for quite a long time. I think the apparel sector has developed a keen understanding of the impacts of climate change. You can see the impacts of flooding, drought, heat, and other things happening in places like Bangladesh and Pakistan and India. If you’re a brand or a manufacturer and you have operations and supply chains in these places, I think you understand what the future will look like if we don’t significantly reduce emissions.
Q: There are different categories of emission levels, depending on the role within the supply chain. Scope 1 are “direct” emissions under the reporting company’s control. For apparel, this might be the production of raw materials or the manufacturing of the finished product. Scope 2 covers “indirect” emissions from purchased energy, such as electricity used in these processes. Scope 3 emissions are harder to track, as they include emissions from supply chain partners both upstream and downstream.
Now companies are finding there are legislative efforts around the world that could soon require them to track and report on all these emissions, including emissions produced by their partners’ supply chains. Does this mean that companies now need to be more aware of not only what greenhouse gas emissions they produce, but also what their partners produce?
A: That’s right. Just to put this into context, if you’re a brand like an Adidas or a Gap, you still have to consider the Scope 3 emissions. In particular, there are the so-called “purchased goods and services,” which refers to all of the embedded emissions in your products, from farming cotton to knitting yarn to making fabric. Those “purchased goods and services” generally account for well above 80% of the total emissions associated with a product. It’s by far the most significant portion of your emissions.
Leading companies have begun measuring and taking action on Scope 3 emissions because of regulatory developments in Europe and, to some extent now, in California. I do think this is just a further tailwind for the work that the industry is doing.
I also think it will definitely ratchet up the quality requirements of Scope 3 data, which is not yet where we’d all like it to be. Companies are working to improve that data, but I think the regulatory push will make the quality side increasingly important.
Q: Overall, do you think the work being done by the Apparel Impact Institute will help reduce greenhouse gas emissions within the industry?
A: When we started this back in 2020, we were at a place where companies were setting targets and knew their intended destination, but what they needed was a blueprint for how to get there. And so, the roadmap [provided] this blueprint and identified six key things that the sector needed to do—from using more sustainable materials to deploying renewable electricity in the supply chain.
Decarbonizing any sector, whether it’s transportation, chemicals, or automotive, requires investment. The Apparel Impact Institute is bringing collective investment, which is so critical. I’m really optimistic about what they’re doing. They have taken a data-driven, evidence-based approach, so they know where the emissions are and they know what the needed interventions are. And they’ve got the industry behind them in doing that.
The global air cargo market’s hot summer of double-digit demand growth continued in August with average spot rates showing their largest year-on-year jump with a 24% increase, according to the latest weekly analysis by Xeneta.
Xeneta cited two reasons to explain the increase. First, Global average air cargo spot rates reached $2.68 per kg in August due to continuing supply and demand imbalance. That came as August's global cargo supply grew at its slowest ratio in 2024 to-date at 2% year-on-year, while global cargo demand continued its double-digit growth, rising +11%.
The second reason for higher rates was an ocean-to-air shift in freight volumes due to Red Sea disruptions and e-commerce demand.
Those factors could soon be amplified as e-commerce shows continued strong growth approaching the hotly anticipated winter peak season. E-commerce and low-value goods exports from China in the first seven months of 2024 increased 30% year-on-year, including shipments to Europe and the US rising 38% and 30% growth respectively, Xeneta said.
“Typically, air cargo market performance in August tends to follow the July trend. But another month of double-digit demand growth and the strongest rate growths of the year means there was definitely no summer slack season in 2024,” Niall van de Wouw, Xeneta’s chief airfreight officer, said in a release.
“Rates we saw bottoming out in late July started picking up again in mid-August. This is too short a period to call a season. This has been a busy summer, and now we’re at the threshold of Q4, it will be interesting to see what will happen and if all the anticipation of a red-hot peak season materializes,” van de Wouw said.
The report cites data showing that there are approximately 1.7 million workers missing from the post-pandemic workforce and that 38% of small firms are unable to fill open positions. At the same time, the “skills gap” in the workforce is accelerating as automation and AI create significant shifts in how work is performed.
That information comes from the “2024 Labor Day Report” released by Littler’s Workplace Policy Institute (WPI), the firm’s government relations and public policy arm.
“We continue to see a labor shortage and an urgent need to upskill the current workforce to adapt to the new world of work,” said Michael Lotito, Littler shareholder and co-chair of WPI. “As corporate executives and business leaders look to the future, they are focused on realizing the many benefits of AI to streamline operations and guide strategic decision-making, while cultivating a talent pipeline that can support this growth.”
But while the need is clear, solutions may be complicated by public policy changes such as the upcoming U.S. general election and the proliferation of employment-related legislation at the state and local levels amid Congressional gridlock.
“We are heading into a contentious election that has already proven to be unpredictable and is poised to create even more uncertainty for employers, no matter the outcome,” Shannon Meade, WPI’s executive director, said in a release. “At the same time, the growing patchwork of state and local requirements across the U.S. is exacerbating compliance challenges for companies. That, coupled with looming changes following several Supreme Court decisions that have the potential to upend rulemaking, gives C-suite executives much to contend with in planning their workforce-related strategies.”
Stax Engineering, the venture-backed startup that provides smokestack emissions reduction services for maritime ships, will service all vessels from Toyota Motor North America Inc. visiting the Toyota Berth at the Port of Long Beach, according to a new five-year deal announced today.
Beginning in 2025 to coincide with new California Air Resources Board (CARB) standards, STAX will become the first and only emissions control provider to service roll-on/roll-off (ro-ros) vessels in the state of California, the company said.
Stax has rapidly grown since its launch in the first quarter of this year, supported in part by a $40 million funding round from investors, announced in July. It now holds exclusive service agreements at California ports including Los Angeles, Long Beach, Hueneme, Benicia, Richmond, and Oakland. The firm has also partnered with individual companies like NYK Line, Hyundai GLOVIS, Equilon Enterprises LLC d/b/a Shell Oil Products US (Shell), and now Toyota.
Stax says it offers an alternative to shore power with land- and barge-based, mobile emissions capture and control technology for shipping terminal and fleet operators without the need for retrofits.
In the case of this latest deal, the Toyota Long Beach Vehicle Distribution Center imports about 200,000 vehicles each year on ro-ro vessels. Stax will keep those ships green with its flexible exhaust capture system, which attaches to all vessel classes without modification to remove 99% of emitted particulate matter (PM) and 95% of emitted oxides of nitrogen (NOx). Over the lifetime of this new agreement with Toyota, Stax estimated the service will account for approximately 3,700 hours and more than 47 tons of emissions controlled.
“We set out to provide an emissions capture and control solution that was reliable, easily accessible, and cost-effective. As we begin to service Toyota, we’re confident that we can meet the needs of the full breadth of the maritime industry, furthering our impact on the local air quality, public health, and environment,” Mike Walker, CEO of Stax, said in a release. “Continuing to establish strong partnerships will help build momentum for and trust in our technology as we expand beyond the state of California.”
That result showed that driver wages across the industry continue to increase post-pandemic, despite a challenging freight market for motor carriers. The data comes from ATA’s “Driver Compensation Study,” which asked 120 fleets, more than 150,000 employee drivers, and 14,000 independent contractors about their wage and benefit information.
Drilling into specific categories, linehaul less-than-truckload (LTL) drivers earned a median annual amount of $94,525 in 2023, while local LTL drivers earned a median of $80,680. The median annual compensation for drivers at private carriers has risen 12% since 2021, reaching $95,114 in 2023. And leased-on independent contractors for truckload carriers were paid an annual median amount of $186,016 in 2023.
The results also showed how the demographics of the industry are changing, as carriers offered smaller referral and fewer sign-on bonuses for new drivers in 2023 compared to 2021 but more frequently offered tenure bonuses to their current drivers and with a greater median value.
"While our last study, conducted in 2021, illustrated how drivers benefitted from the strongest freight environment in a generation, this latest report shows professional drivers' earnings are still rising—even in a weaker freight economy," ATA Chief Economist Bob Costello said in a release. "By offering greater tenure bonuses to their current driver force, many fleets appear to be shifting their workforce priorities from recruitment to retention."